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‘An attentive Ear, a watchful Eye, and a Calm judicious Pen’: William Samuel
Johnson, the Colonial Agents, and the Transformation of the British Atlantic World

By Allison Hopkins

Since the 1960’s, histories of the American Revolution and Georgian Britain have
often been provincial in focus, examining local rather than imperial issues. Recently,
however, there has been a return to studying the Atlantic world as a whole, building on
the work done by scholars such as Jack M. Sosin and Michael Kammen, who focused on
the political and economic influence of colonial agents as part of the institutional empire.
A second wave of this type of history, particularly new British literature, is now looking
at questions of identity and examining immigrants, slaves, and London merchants in a
social context. By looking at Great Britain and the American colonies in conjunction with
the larger British Atlantic Empire, historians can better understand the political, social,
and cultural transformations that occurred when transatlantic actors met. However, the
agents—one of the most politically astute groups integral to the management of the
institutional empire—have been virtually ignored by these developments. The
correspondence of Connecticut agent William Samuel Johnson (1727-1819) allows a reevaluation of developments in the field since Kammen and Sosin, particularly on the
issue of identity in the British Atlantic Empire. While there have been studies on famous
agents and future Founding Fathers like Benjamin Franklin, it is just as necessary to take
into account lesser-known agents, as well as those who differed in opinion from the
Patriot elites.
William Samuel Johnson is an example of an “ordinary” agent who nonetheless
had extensive contacts with numerous British and American thinkers. While acting on
Connecticut’s behalf in London between 1767 and 1771, he sent reports back to
Connecticut governors Jonathan Trumbull and William Pitkin on parliamentary
proceedings while corresponding with the people who traveled around the Atlantic world
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during this critical period—merchants, seafarers, emigrants, soldiers, missionaries,
radicals and conservatives, reformers, and politicians. As an Anglican who believed in
political moderation, Johnson sought common ground and engaged with loyalists and
Patriots, Tories and Whigs, and formed firm friendships with English elites across the
political spectrum. His correspondents included both the pro-American merchant
Nicholas Ray as well as the pro-government minister Benjamin LaTrobe.
He is also representative of the late eighteenth-century empire writ large. Agents,
who had once been a source of stability in the far-flung colonies, became a destabilizing
force as confusion and conflict grew over conceptual ideas of what constituted “the
empire” and who was included in it. Johnson was a sane observer in the midst of the
ideological and administrative upheaval of the 1760’s and 1770’s. His subsequent
loyalism and political obscurity during the war years was in many ways a result of his
attempts to reconcile various factional interests during his tenure as an agent. Finally, his
eventual “redemption” and reintegration into the political fabric of the early United
States—first as a Senator and signer of the US Constitution, then as president of
Columbia University—points towards a recognition of his service and acceptance of a
new conceptual framework for understanding the Atlantic world.
J.H. Elliott has written in an essay, “English history and American history have all
too often gone their separate ways, without any consistent or sustained dialog between
the two. Now…the mid-Atlantic is a good place to meet.”1 This paper will take a
comparative approach, taking into account both local issues in Connecticut and London
as well as the systems that connected them together. This will be a study in the vein of
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what David Armitage terms “trans-Atlantic history,” or, “the history of the Atlantic world
told through comparisons.”2 This methodology yields answers to questions about the
character and transformation of the disparate territories of the Atlantic world, through the
lens of an agent who was at the center of the debate. The first part of the paper will
discuss the successes and failures of the agents as a whole. The second part will examine
the relationships formed and the rhetoric exchanged between British and American
radicals, who often used the same terminology of liberty and yet had profound gaps in
their worldviews. Thirdly, I will analyze the rift between the colonial, provincial
understanding of the empire (as loose, self-governing entities each with separate
allegiances to the Crown) and the metropolitan understanding of centralized power in
London, based on the constitutional authority of Parliament.3 Finally, I will evaluate the
burgeoning nationalism in the Anglo-American world. If England, Scotland, Wales,
Ireland, and the American colonies were all seen as constituting separate entities within
the empire, it is important to explain how and when the colonies fell beyond the
“boundaries” of British national identity.4
At the same time, however, I acknowledge that William Samuel Johnson and his
correspondents were, fundamentally, cogs in an interconnected system that they could not
necessarily see. Trying to explain complex theoretical and ideological shifts in thinking is
somewhat lacking when overlaid onto a real historical figure’s life. Johnson, although
highly knowledgeable, informed, articulate, and insightful, had his own preoccupations
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and biases. What he mentions as well as does not mention about these issues has equal
significance. Admittedly he also represents an elite, Anglicized point of view, and does
not speak for the general public, although his ideas do reflect the dominant narrative of
his society. Despite the shortcomings inherent in looking at what remains of a person’s
correspondence, “by stressing intentionality or agency, biography should allow the
historian to see how individuals react to invisible forces.”5 Johnson was an individual
with both remarkable intentionality and yet little real authority. His career path differed
sharply from agents such as Benjamin Franklin, who were radicalized by the American
independence movement and were therefore compromised in their negotiations with
Parliament. In contrast, Johnson was first and foremost an imperial agent who found his
loyalties tested as the colonists and British government acted with increasing
immoderation.
As a link between the two sides, however, Johnson was part of a dying breed and
men like him were shunted aside as tensions mounted. P.D.G. Thomas even asserted that
the agents became “obsolete” after the repeal of the Stamp Act.6 Certainly by the time
Johnson left to go home to Stratford in 1771, diplomacy was left in the hands of
increasingly radical men like Franklin. Although he did his best to reconcile various
factions and provide an accurate account of the powerful nationalistic forces gathering on
both sides of the Atlantic on the eve of the American Revolution, the agents’ collective
failures as transatlantic mediators helped bring about the collapse of an imperial
community. This disintegration had dramatic effects on the whole of the Atlantic world.
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“Agent, an American born, who sees and feels the worth of Liberty”7
Agents had been an integral part of the imperial Atlantic system since the early
seventeenth century. As the position of the agent developed, they were given increased
responsibilities and became important lobbyists and mediators in the governance of the
colonies. Most of the agents had backgrounds in law and politics, and a large part of their
duties centered on negotiating colony finances and regulating trade. Initially colonial
agents went to London for specialized missions, but the eighteenth century saw the
establishment of a bureaucracy of agents permanently stationed in London. Like other
Enlightenment intellectuals, they frequented coffeehouses and moved in elite circles.
Often colonial assemblies would assign special agents to settle land disputes with
Native American tribes. Johnson was an agent of this type. By profession and training a
lawyer, and also active in Connecticut politics, in 1766 the General Assembly appointed
him as a special agent representing Connecticut to the Privy Council. The dispute
concerned lands deeded to the Mason family by the Mohegan Indians, which the General
Assembly refused to ratify. The Masons then decided to place their claim before the
Privy Council. Johnson would assist the regular agent, Englishman Richard Jackson. His
stay in London was supposed to be short and focused on resolving the Mohegan case in
favor of the colony. Instead, he remained there for five years.
The role of the agent was undergoing great administrative change during the
1760’s. The Seven Years’ War and the abandonment of salutary neglect increased their
importance and broadened the scope of their activities beyond the Board of Trade and
7
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into Parliament, where they used their position to influence legislation. In a shift from the
past, increasingly many of the agents were not colonists, but British civil servants.8 Of
course, most of them had ties on both sides of the Atlantic, or had lived for several years
in the colonies. The agents representing their home colonies, however—notably
Benjamin Franklin, Jared Ingersoll, and William Samuel Johnson—felt a strain on their
dual loyalties to their provincial governments and the central government in London by
the end of the 1760’s. This was a period of contradictions: at the height of the agents’
importance and cooperation as a group, the colonial assemblies constrained their efforts
by failing to provide instructions, authority, and funds.
In evaluating the conduct and successes of the agents as a whole, historians have
asked two fundamental questions: how effective were they, and was their effectiveness
hampered by the radical behavior of the colonists? Did this radicalization then cause
them to misrepresent the situation in England to their constituents back home? Did they
misrepresent the situation in America to Parliament? These questions have divided
historians, and admit of no easy answers. In Agents and Merchants: British Colonial
Policy and the Origins of the American Revolution, 1763-1775, Sosin concluded that
although the agents ultimately failed in their responsibilities, they did succeed in several
important areas, such as securing the repeal of the Stamp Act in the 1760’s.9 Sosin
attributed the repeal of the act to the arbitration of the agents rather than colonial
pressure, but also noted that the agents were united with London merchants and dealing
with a confused, divided British government. Thomas asserted that the Stamp Act repeal
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was more the result of the political change of administration from Grenville to
Rockingham, based on economic considerations, than because of any protest on the part
of the colonists, merchants, or agents.10 These favorable conditions would not be repeated
in the 1770’s, when merchant support withered and the North ministry came into power
and exerted tighter control.
The colonists also sometimes had a different agenda than their agents. During the
1760’s, according to Sosin, colonial leaders did not listen to the advice of their agents and
through their agitation confirmed to Parliament and the British public that they were
seeking independence rather than the repeal of specific acts.11 The colonists certainly did
not listen to Johnson’s advice from his British friends not to publicize the NonImportation agreements. The agents, Sosin argued, were desperately trying to avoid the
issue of parliamentary sovereignty, but their effectiveness was “seriously impaired and
their position in British government circles jeopardized by political animosities in the
colonies…linked with the developing revolutionary challenge to imperial authority.”12
Johnson experienced the difficulty in acting without his constituents’ express permission;
the agents wanted to draw up a petition to Parliament silent on the issue of the right to tax
the colonies, but feared that it would be misconstrued as a “ground of declaration that the
Colonies had, by their Agents, in effect receded from their claim of exemption from
Parliamentary taxation as of right.”13 By the 1770’s colonial governments recalled agents
with conciliatory views and ties with those in power (like Johnson) and replaced them
with agents aligned with the independence movement. Sosin highlighted the close
10
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relationship between merchants and agents, at least in the 1760’s, and blamed the
breakdown of relations primarily on the colonists and the administration. The agents, on
the other hand, were true metropolitan figures.
When examining the actions of the colonists and Parliament, however, Sosin
neglected to take into account that the agents were the primary source of news and
channel of intelligence for colonial governments. Therefore, the agents must bear some
responsibility for the failure to bring about a reconciliation and compromise. This is the
view of Kammen in A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the
American Revolution. In contrast to Sosin, who emphasized cooperation and connection,
Kammen argued that the agents actually helped facilitate and increase the separation
between Britain and the colonies. Their correspondence “fed the hungry discontented
with provocative and sometimes distorted views that seemed to vindicate their own
deepest suspicions…they reinforced the agitated provincials’ sense of alienation from
Parliament and the Empire.”14 This is a bold assertion. It is certainly true that radical
agents like Franklin (particularly towards the end of his tumultuous tenure in London) did
abandon neutrality and voice his outright support for independence. He was certainly
intentionally provocative. However, this was not the case for the majority of agents,
though perhaps the restless and angry colonists overstated their honest appraisals of the
political atmosphere in London.
In his personal letters and official reports to the governors, Johnson himself
provided not only moderate opinions but plenty of ammunition against Parliament. His
intention was never to deepen the chasm between the two countries, but his
correspondence did reinforce discontent in the Connecticut assembly. Kammen
14
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overstated his case, however, when he argued that there was a significant break in the
connection between the agents and the English, leading to a “waning influence of
America and Americans in London.”15 Johnson, for example, does not fit Kammen’s
model. On the contrary, whatever his own views were, and whatever he reported back to
the colonies, the ties he formed in England proved to be the deciding factor in forestalling
his political radicalization, culminating in his loyalist sympathies during the war. For
Johnson, who left England in 1771 but remained in contact with numerous friends, his
experience as an agent separated him from the provincial views of most other colonial
leaders.

“An almost desperate game”16
The political turmoil and partisan politics in Parliament meant that the Mohegan
case was not high on the government’s list of priorities.17 American affairs, too,
distracted Johnson from the case. His attention was supposed to be focused on a specific
case concerning a single colony, but instead he unexpectedly found himself as an
advocate of American rights in general. As frustrating as he found the delay of the case,
he spent his time wisely, acting as the eyes and ears for his employers. As Governor
William Pitkin reassured him, “The Intelligence you are from time to time favouring me
with, you may well conclude is acceptable in this critical Day. An attentive Ear, a
watchful Eye, and a calm judicious Pen, are often helpful to others, in forming a
Judgment, and regulating their Conduct.”18 For the most part this is an accurate
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description of Johnson, who certainly had an attentive ear and watchful eye, if not always
a calm, judicious pen. Because Johnson gave intelligence during the critical upheavals
leading to the American Revolution, he was aware of the worth of his observations:
I am very happy for the intelligence I am able to transmit home and attention to
the interests of the Colonies gives many satisfactions while continuing here. I
shall ultimately leave no stone unturned to discern as far as possible all the doings
and Intentions, views, and connections of those who have it in their power to
befriend or injure us, as well as to prevent as far as I am able any Mischief that
may be designed us.19

Preventing that mischief, though, was a challenge. Johnson arrived in London
shortly after the agents had reached the pinnacle of success in repealing the Stamp Act.
By the time he left, the agents’ heyday was over, their power and influence on a rapid
decline.20 They, along with merchants, were figures that bound the British Atlantic
community together, but despite these connections (as well as political sway within
Parliament itself), Johnson held little actual power himself. At best, he could work with
the other agents to petition Parliament, try to sway popular opinion in the colonies’ favor,
and try to exert influence through dealings with sympathetic MP’s. In addition, the agents
faced two difficult problems. Firstly, they had to carefully guard the privacy of their work
to maintain both their popularity back home and their trustworthiness in the eyes of
Parliament. Secondly, they had to accurately report parliamentary proceedings in an
extremely hostile and precarious environment.
Johnson was sensible of the delicacy of his position. In a postscript to Governor
Pitkin, he reminded him,

19

Johnson to Pitkin, January 23, 1768, WSJ Papers.
Peter D.G. Thomas, The Townsend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the American Revolution, 17671773 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 219.
20

10

Though with regard to myself I believe it perfectly needless, yet it may not
perhaps be amiss to mention to you, that very great offence has been taken here at
the frequent publication in America of extracts of letters from agents and others
residing here, especially when they have taken the liberty to mention the names of
great persons in or out of administration. This has not often been done in
Connecticut, and I doubt not all proper prudence will be used with respect to
everything of this kind.21

Johnson’s emphasis on secrecy and propriety extended even to private letters to his
father. His fears were not misplaced. Perhaps he was thinking of the troubles faced by his
close friend and fellow agent Jared Ingersoll two years before. Even though Ingersoll had
petitioned Parliament against the legislation while in London, the people of Connecticut
reviled him for his role as a Stamp Act distributor. After a mob attacked him and
demanded that he resign his post, The Connecticut Gazette published some of his private
papers, forcing him to make the entire correspondence public in order to prove his
allegiance to the colony. As a further precaution, he suspended all correspondence to
England. Privately, he wrote to Johnson that “in private Letters altho’ there should be
nothing wicked or offensive you know how disagreeable it must be to have ones own
most free thoughts like tete a tete Conversations proclaimed aloud on house tops.”22
Indiscretions also made life difficult for agents. In 1774, Benjamin Franklin
procured the private letters of Massachusetts lieutenant governor Thomas Hutchinson and
secretary Andrew Oliver, which implicated them in urging Parliament to take a tough
stance against the colony (without the knowledge of the agents). He sent them to Thomas
Cushing and they spread to several Massachusetts patriots, who immediately printed
copies and made them public to the Massachusetts government. The outcry against
21
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Franklin in England was considerable, and the scandal “effectively curtailed Franklin’s
agency…his usefulness as a public lobbyist was at an end.”23 Johnson seems to have
anticipated this, warning Trumbull that
Indeed, all the correspondence with America is now so narrowly watched, and so
much umbrage is taken at the communication of anything, either in point of fact
or opinion, that they are pleased to call improper, that it is become more than ever
necessary for all on this side to request of their friends the utmost degree of
caution with respect to whatever they write, for this obvious reason amongst
many others, lest by exposing them they occasion their being so guarded against
as to render it impossible for them to obtain the intelligence they would wish to
have communicated. Some imprudences of this kind in some of the other
Colonies have been very prejudicial.24

Nonetheless, Johnson did his best to uncover what was going on in Parliament
even when he, as an American, was not welcome. For instance, he related to Ingersoll
how he managed to “slip in at the last debate” in Parliament over a proposed tax on tea
and the Mutiny Act in New York, even though “the American agents were expressly
ordered not to be admitted.”25 He managed to “escape” before being found out. The
agents faced other difficulties beyond a lack of access. Johnson did not have an esteemed
view of the parliamentary system and how it functioned in the late 1760’s. The
government went through several changes of ministries, and Johnson noted the
prevalence of party politics and a focus on electioneering. Parties, he believed, “threaten
a dissolution of the whole political system, and the ruin of the empire.”26 Johnson was
equally suspicious of the motives of the Whigs and Tories. The only bright side he saw
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was that MP’s spent most of their time campaigning and raising massive funds for
elections, and therefore were too busy to cause more trouble towards the colonies.
Perhaps many of the disputes between Britain and the colonies arose due to the
confusing and indecisive nature of Parliament’s often ad hoc policies. Before discussing
how Parliament was arguing over whether acquisitions made by the East India Company
should belong to the company or the government, as well as debating a new tax on tea
and china and figuring out how to respond to New York’s refusal to billet troops, Johnson
acknowledged that the complexity of British politics hindered him from providing useful
intelligence:
Such has been the confusion amongst the Ministers in this country, and so great
the uncertainty with respect to all public measures since I came here, that I have
been in fear to write you at all upon public affairs, lest I should mislead, and give
wrong notions; or lest, if I should give you the best intelligence that could be
collected in the morning, the whole face of things should be changed before
evening, and it would become necessary to contradict one day what I had wrote
you on the other. Either the designs of government and their system is too
complex, deep, and close to be discovered, not by my very weak and feeble
penetration only, but by the whole body (and they are certainly a very numerous
and respectable one) of those who are endeavoring, not only to discover, but
many of them to counteract them too; or else they have very little design, and act
without a plan, and only from the varying appearances as they arise…I fear it is
rather the latter.27
Johnson entered a political milieu that was highly politicized, and he despaired of ever
divining the true intentions of the administration towards the colonies. He eventually
came to the conclusion that neither party was concerned with the colonies’ benefit, and
that any support would come “so far as may serve the purposes of pure opposition, not
upon the great principles upon which we stand.”28 Johnson had a particularly astute
understanding of politics; though the Rockingham Whigs claimed to be “friends of
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America” based on their opposition to the Stamp Act and efforts in securing its repeal,
they insisted it was a matter of expediency and supported the passage of the Declaratory
Act. The Chathamites similarly made claims that were not borne out by legislation like
the Townsend Acts.29 Johnson’s assessment of Lord Hillsborough, head of American
affairs, was that he was a smooth-talking courtier, not a true ally despite his “pompous
declarations of affection for the Colonies.”30 Americans, Johnson concluded, could not
rely on parliamentary or ministerial machinations. They had to rely on themselves.
During the first two years of his agency, then, Johnson had fuelled the flames of
resentment against the government in his reports to the governors. However, as he began
to make contacts and friendships with those in England, his ideology shifted towards his
eventual loyalist position.
“I persuade myself I have made a friendship with you”31
“America has few friends” in London, wrote Johnson to Pitkin in 1767.32 Yet at
the same time he was reporting Parliament’s rhetoric against the colonies, he was forming
partnerships and deep friendships with British radical thinkers and taking up a lively
correspondence with those who questioned British imperialism in both North America
and India. Johnson intended to make contacts with politicians from all sides of the
political spectrum. As he admitted to Pitkin, discerning Parliament’s intentions towards
America could be confusing “owing, I am sensible, to the different company I converse
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with (and I choose to mix with some of both kinds).”33 He repeatedly made efforts to
ingratiate himself with Lord Hillsborough on Connecticut’s behalf. Like many agents, his
own reputation hindered his success. Years later a British friend confessed that
Hillsborough “had for a long time taken you for an Independent, and as one who was as
violent in the opposition as most of the Americans were, that as this was a general
opinion, you was not so much attended to touching your person as you should have
been.”34 Hillsborough and the other ministers feared that an independence movement had
begun to take root in the colonies. Hillsborough also seems to have had trouble
understanding Johnson’s political views, since he (like most Americans) did not
necessarily fit the Tory-Whig paradigm. Johnson’s difficulties were indicative of the
constrained agency of the American-born agents as a whole. In addition, outright support
for the American cause was not popular. Barlow Trecothick, a pro-American merchant
and MP, found it difficult to get elected as the mayor of London due to his American
sympathies.
As much as he tried to make contacts with those unfriendly towards the colonies’
interests, most of Johnson’s friendships developed with people who shared similar views.
His social circle encompassed a surprisingly large radius, and he found a significant
number of “Friends of America” outside the parliamentary system (notwithstanding
Trecothick, Barre, and others). These included the country gentry, not usually considered
a major demographic of colonial support. Yet Johnson wrote that
I have had the great pleasure, also, in several excursions I have made into the
country in the course of the summer, to find that the cause of the Colonies has
gained ground among the country gentlemen and the bulk of the substantial
people, as it had before done in the city;--with many, I believe, from a rational
33
34

Johnson to Pitkin, March 19, 1767, WSJ Papers.
LaTrobe to Johnson, February 9, 1772, WSJ Papers.

15

conviction of the justice and equity of our claims; with more, perhaps, from
apprehensions of the loss of those emoluments which they have derived from our
connection with them.35
Although Johnson contradicted himself here, complaining about the condescending
treatment of Americans in London, but then (perhaps too optimistically) reporting of
widespread support in the countryside, he was cynical enough to ascribe this support
partly to commercial motives.
A particular country gentleman and friend was James Theobald, the owner of the
country estate Waltham Place, in Berkshire. In 1768 Theobald wrote to Johnson to
“favour me with any particular occurrences that may happen relating to our North
American friends, the Sons of Liberty, as I am unhappily situated among a set of
neighbours who are for correcting them for what they call Disobedience, though its my
opinion that their perseverance will in the end be the saving of this Country from
slavery.”36 Johnson was not only a conduit for news heading back to the colonies, but a
source of information for interested supporters in England. Though Johnson was in
London at the time, Theobald apparently thought him well-informed enough to provide
accurate information from his contacts back in Connecticut, another way in which agents
occupied the space been popular politics and traditional political influence. Johnson
replied to Theobald,

Your worthy neighbors I fear do not know the true state of things in their Country.
They would surely not correct Chilson for Complaining and Remonstrating
against any attacks upon essential Liberties, much less for maintaining those
Principles of Liberty which they have been taught both by the precepts and
example of this Country. They only wish to be as free as Englishmen are sought
to be and to their equality in the Commonwealth of Britain, as your friends would
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not deny them this, and they ask no more. To enslave one part of the Empire is to
prepare slavery for the whole.37
Johnson’s postscript showed his pride in his identity as an Englishman and his
inclusion into the Empire and Commonwealth. Furthermore, he made it clear that a
rupture of liberties in one part of the Empire would signal a lack of liberty in other
parts—even Britain. These sentiments were perfectly in line with his other observations.
Although he was often circumspect in his official reports, to his father he reflected on the
high levels of poverty and the gap between the rich and poor in the country, and noted
that
But alas! Amidst all this Magnificence how many things are amiss! Irreligion,
Luxury, Dissipation, Fashion, Consumption, Vice, & Villainy are making horrible
inroads, and unless corrected threatens to prostrate their Glory in the dust. The
Vices of the Nation amaze you, while their splendor dazzles you—when you
consider the Grandeur, Wealth, and Power of this People, they seem to be
superior to everything and permanent as the Mountains; when you contemplate
their Irreligion, their Factions, & their Vices they seem hastening to sudden &
irretrievable destruction, and one is astonished that they exist. I have a thousand
things to say to you upon the state of things here both Civil & Religious which
would be endless to write & many of them improper to trust to Paper.38
This is a theme taken up by British radicals: that England had lost sight of its republican
principles, and the conflict with America was both a symptom and cure.

“The spirit of liberty is well-awakened, and in full glow here”39
Radical thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic often exchanged ideas, support, and
arguments in favor of increased political liberty. They often used the same vocabulary
and shared a tradition of constitutional rights. Historian Eliga Gould writes that they were
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both proud of the freedom enjoyed in the British Atlantic world.40 However, American
leaders often “overestimated British radical influence in England,” in large part due to
reports from agents like Johnson.41 Merchants, for instance, were instrumental in
repealing the Stamp Act, but acted primarily out of economic considerations and became
less interested as their focus shifted to trade in the East Indies.
However, London merchants did have influence with American agents; one of
Johnson’s most important correspondents was the staunchly pro-American merchant
Nicolas Ray. Ray grew up in Boston, but, exhibiting the mobility of the age, moved
permanently to London at age twenty-one. He was a British correspondent with the New
York Sons of Liberty. In this and in other matters he was more radical than Johnson, who
did not approve of the Son’s extremism and considered them a mob (based on fearful
reports from loyalist friends). As a merchant and emigrant, Ray held close commercial
and sentimental ties to the colonies, and was strongly in favor of the non-importation
agreements. Ray’s status as a merchant in part drove his radical ideology. Continuing his
correspondence with Johnson into the 1770’s, when Johnson had returned to Connecticut,
Ray warned about the dangers of imperialism and luxury, which was a common focus of
critique in the late eighteenth century.42 In his view,
England at present, Excells both Greece and Rome in Barbarity, Inhumanity &
every Species of Villainy in India in pursuit of plunder…So that it is clear to me
Asia by its Immaginary Wealth will strip this Kingdom of its Liberty. For these
reasons I am determin’d to be no ways concerned in defusing or scattering the
baneful goods of India tha’o the Collonies, & for this Resolution I am sure I have
your applause. You I think are of the Legislature, is it not possible to bring such
40
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goods in disrepute and the wearer of them contemptible whilst those of your own
make should be Respectable and Honorable.43
Johnson responded by praising homespun and the efforts of local manufactures within
Connecticut. Ray was equally critical of Parliament, particularly the way wealth could
“buy” seats and votes, noting that European states, particularly England, are “allow’d
tha’o parliaments to put on their own chains, which, by being neatly filed & polish’d,
they would persuade the people are not chains Till they are Effectually Rivetted…”44 Ray
contrasted this favorably to the obscurity, self-reliance, and lack of legislative corruption
in the colonies, casting himself as someone who has seen “Tyranny and Slavery Tread
underfoot the Natural Libertys of Mankind” in Europe and Johnson as someone living “in
a colony where the Libertys of Mankind are better understood and Enjoyed than in any
other spot on Earth.”45
Seven years earlier, in 1766, Ray had published a pamphlet entitled “The
Importance of the Colonies of North America, and the Interests of Great Britain with
regard to them, Considered, Together with Remarks on the Stamp Duty.” In it he touched
on many of the same themes, particularly American freedoms compared to Europe, but
made the mercantilist argument that the colonies should focus on trade, centered around
Britain, rather than developing their industry. It is significant that only a few years later
he praises the non-importation agreements, recommends that the colonies cut off all
foreign trade, and even suggests that it would be better for the colonies if Philadelphia,
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New York, and Boston were all destroyed.46 Ray had become radicalized between 1766
and 1774.
Johnson, although warning the colonies not to loudly broadcast non-importation,
saw their united firmness in the economic boycott as the only means to preserve public
morality and guarantee parliamentary compliance. When the agreement fell through in
1770, he recognized that this would be a sign to Parliament that their coercive measures
were working and would eventually force the colonies into obedience. Worse, it
discouraged their European supporters. “Is this, it is said, your American firmness? Are
these the examples you give us of your fortitude, your patriotism and perseverance?”
Johnson wrote in disgust. “The eyes of all Europe were turned towards America, and on
the issue of this controversy was to be formed their idea of your character. It is done;
your character is now fixed; you will make a very contemptible figure in the eyes of all
mankind, and disgrace the fair page of history.”47 America had failed to live up to the
claims of European supporters like Ray.
Though Johnson readily admitted that the British ideology of liberty informed
American ideas of liberty, he hesitated to attribute influence in the opposite direction and
denied any American influence on popular British politics and reform movements. A
critic of the popular John Wilkes, Johnson believed him to be as partisan, self-serving,
and hypocritical as other politicians. Like British “Real” Whigs, the colonists supported
the Wilkite cause and saw Wilkes’s struggle for an expansion of representative
government reflected in their own struggle for representation.48 Johnson, however,
pragmatically concluded that Wilkes would only support the colonies if it was in his own
46
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self interest. He decried how Wilkes stirred up the violent passions of the people, who
rioted after he was jailed, complaining that “I have the mortification to hear many
perversely impute them to the example (as they say) set in the Colonies, and the debility
discovered by the government here in yielding to them and repealing the Stamp Act,
which (being so totally without any manner of foundation) only serves to show how very
ready those who make observations are to turn every circumstance to the disadvantage of
the Colonies.”49 Yet Johnson also recognized the deeper forces at work in the disturbance
of the populace. He conceded that Wilkes, “accidentally not intentionally I fear” has
released the “spirit of liberty” of people frustrated with both the king and Parliament.50
Johnson put the blame for the disturbances in Boston and in London squarely on the
shoulders of the ministry. Drawing the connection between the Middlesex election
dispute and the situation in the colonies, he predicted a political revolution:
They have now a great and very important constitutional question of
representation to agitate, which nearly affects all their rights, and is not totally
unconnected with that of the Colonies, who may perhaps derive some material
advantage from this litigation. The subject has attracted the attention, and excites
the expectations of all the people of England; and if the freeholders and those who
have espoused their cause persevere with the same fervent zeal by which they
seem at present to be animated, the affair may, perhaps, be attended with very
serious consequences.51

In fact, although the war initially forestalled parliamentary and commercial
reforms, British and American interaction in this period laid the groundwork for future
advancements. The war itself, along with the French Revolution, prompted a return to
conservatism and the status quo, and set Britain more firmly on the path of heavy-handed
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imperialism in India.52 However, progress was made in extraparliamentary issues such as
the abolition of the slave trade and the resurgence of social reforms with the rise of
evangelical Christianity.53 The swell of parliamentary criticism in this period also laid the
groundwork for greater democratization in the 1830’s.54 The dire warnings of Ray,
Theobald, and Johnson himself—that England was on a path to tyranny because of their
conduct towards the colonies—proved unfounded, as they remained fixed on their system
while recognizing that it needed reforms. The dialogue opened up by the convergence of
colonial and metropolitan political thought reverberated not only in America but in
Britain as well.

“The Crown they reverence and love”55
Recently, some historians have argued that Americans right up until the moment
of revolution were more monarchical than their metropolitan counterparts, who were
justly proud of the supremacy of Parliament over absolute monarchy.56 For the colonies,
however, it was the king who bound them to the Empire. Brendan McConville argues that
“before the Revolution, Americans wanted more patriarchy and more empire, not less,
and strangely, such desires…helped unravel the imperial state.”57 The Empire meant
access to commerce all around the Atlantic. It meant protection by a benevolent monarch,
safeguarding liberties and Protestantism. It meant a shared heritage and a common
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identity. However, the “British Atlantic Empire” was an ideological construct rather than
an inherent, real institution.58 The provincial American view—of loose, self governing
entities bound by commerce and loyalty to the monarch—did not correspond with the
metropolitan understanding of the empire, with constitutional and parliamentary
supremacy centralized on the metropolitan center, London.59 Hillsborough pejoratively
termed the American system “polytheism in politics…fatal to the constitution.”60
Furthermore, while the two parts of the empire shared a common heritage of liberty, it
differed sharply between “American popular sovereignty” and “British parliamentary
sovereignty.”61 Not only was authority not vested in the same governmental body, there
was disagreement over how many “bodies” there should be.
The “American conception of empire,” which posed a challenge to Parliament’s
claims of absolute authority, came to a head in the debate over taxation without
representation. British politicians saw it as a civil dispute; to Americans, the issue was as
much about parliamentary sovereignty as it was about taxation. This kind of rhetoric was
present in many of the petitions that colonial governments sent to the king, and was
popular in pamphlets and propaganda as well. In a somewhat sycophantic petition to
Hillsborough, Governor Pitkin made the odd claim that Parliament’s taxes deprive the
colonies of “making a free Gift…or voluntarily complying with any Requisition of our
rightful Lord and Sovereign” in bearing some of the financial burdens for the Seven
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Years’ War.62 His argument, that only the king has the authority to tax the colonies
according to their royal charters, was common. Johnson put it succinctly in a letter to
Pitkin in 1768: “You are loyal only to the king, you are not so to the Parliament.”63
This larger debate played out in microcosm when in 1768 Johnson was granted an
audience with Lord Hillsborough, who had been put in charge of American affairs earlier
that year. Johnson tried to assure Hillsborough of Connecticut’s tranquility and loyalty,
but inadvertently entangled himself in a debate. In particular, he tried to convince
Hillsborough that the charter granted to Connecticut by Charles II gave it the authority to
make legislation for itself, rather than be subject to Parliament. Hillsborough did not
agree, and Johnson bemoaned how little the ministers knew of the colonies, and the
“loose, mistaken notions” great men in power had “of colony rights.”64
These problems were particularly acute in the Mohegan case and in Johnson’s
advice to the Susquehanna Company over their dispute with Pennsylvania. Johnson was
frustrated with Mason for insisting that the Indians had not gotten justice from the
colonial government, instead applying to the Privy Council. On one hand, in his list of
arguments to the Privy Council, Johnson argued that Indians were “subjects of the
Colony and as such of his Majesty.” On the other hand, he continued, “and the Treaty of
1638 contains an express Subjugation to the laws of the Colony.” His main arguments,
then, relied on the rights of the colony “by virtue of the charter.” In a letter to Trumbull
concerning the Susquehanna Company’s claims to land in Pennsylvania, Johnson warned
that if the colony took up the company’s claim it would “give much offense” and
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“umbrage” in London.65 Parliament, he claimed, did not give credence to ancient
charters. This posed a challenge to lawyers like Johnson who argued in the colony’s favor
over land disputes with the Mohegans and Pennsylvania on the basis of the royal charter.
Throughout the prolonged trial, Johnson never expressed much optimism that the Privy
Council would ever decide in Connecticut’s favor, perhaps reflecting what he saw as a
small example of the British government’s larger disdain for colonial rights.
Perhaps, like many Americans, he was also becoming disillusioned with George
III when he opened his letter to fellow American agent Jared Ingersoll with “Put not yr.
trust in Parliaments nor in Princes if I was you I would assume for my Motto.”66 Many
colonial governments, including Connecticut’s, sent petitions to the king and were
dismayed to hear from their agents that the petitions were neither given to the king nor
even acknowledged. Although Hillsborough repeatedly reassured Johnson that the king
cared for all his subjects, including Americans, Johnson never fully trusted him. Just as
he and Hillsborough could not see eye to eye, disagreement over this fundamental issue
would prove insurmountable in the decade leading up to revolution. With condemnation
rather than support from the king, Americans turned against him, portraying him as a
tyrant to delegitimize his rule and provide a justification for independence.
Divergent British and American understandings of empire closely connected to
two different conceptualizations of national identities. Americans steadfastly viewed
themselves as English subjects, integral to the functioning of the Empire.67 Loyalist
Nathan Whiting clearly viewed revolutionary discontent in America and England as
being part of a single, large system: “The times look very gloomy & there seem to be
65
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strong symptoms of a great revolution in the mighty Bh E—what will follow God only
knows, America being part of the Empire and so connected with the head that any shock
there must greatly affect it.”68 In his pamphlet Ray emphasized that “the Colonies are our
Bretheren and fellow-Subjects, free-born Britons equally as we are, and entitled equally
with every right and privilege of Britons.”69 Right up until 1776, this is in fact what the
colonists were arguing themselves.
At the same time, British identity was becoming increasingly geographicallycentered and restricted to the British Isles, with North America beyond the line of
demarcation.70 Johnson seems to have had an intuitive grasp of the transforming identity
politics. Prior to meeting Hillsborough, Johnson suggested to Pitkin that “as a native of
Ireland…it may be hoped that he has formed reasonable notions of the rights and liberties
of the distant branches of this empire, and would not be disposed to confine all power and
all political felicity to the shores of this island.”71 Pitkin’s own realistic assessment of the
situation was that “it is painfull to hear the Colonies compared to Ireland who are
subjected by Conquest and by their Conduct forfeited those Immunities which we are
justly Intitled to.”72 Pitkin saw identity as based on political rights, making the colonies
more entitled to representation than Ireland. Ironically, this was the time—partly brought
on by the imperial restructuring and conflict with the colonies—that a larger “British,” as
opposed to solely English, identity began to emerge.73 Historian Eliga Gould concludes
that with the American Revolution, “never again would the British think of any part of
68
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their empire as an extension of their own nation—at least not in the way they had before
1776.”74
Historians have debated whether there was a corresponding emerging American
patriotic nationalism prior to the war. J.C.D. Clark has argued that it did not exist, and
that the ideology of liberty only “tied the colonists more firmly into the English Whig
myth.”75 True American nationalism, then, would not arise until after independence,
certainly not until 1776. He is correct in that the colonies understood their rights
primarily in terms of their status as Englishmen. However, a definite—if inchoate—sense
of a separate American identity was beginning to take root well before the Declaration of
Independence. In a profession dominated by Englishmen, Pitkin was confident of
Johnson’s success and that “the Sum expended for the Maintenance of Agent, an
American born, who sees and feels the worth of Liberty, has tasted its Pleasures, and is
Expectant of enjoying its future happy Fruits, is well appropriated.”76 To Pitkin,
Johnson’s American identity was more important than his status as a trans-Atlantic
figure. As Johnson wrote in 1769, “the controversy is not…between the prince and the
subject, but between subject and subject, between the people of America and the people
of Britain, which shall have the power over American property in the very important
point of taxation.”77 The idea that there are “people of America” and “people of Britain”
emerged during this time period and became more acute in the aftermath of the American
Revolution.
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“The true Christian is unconsistent with modern Patriotism”78
One reason Johnson was able to so easily adapt into English society—a factor
which should not be neglected—was his membership in the Church of England. As an
Anglican, he had a wide breadth of contacts amongst the upper echelons of society. He
was unimpressed, however, by the general lack of religiosity in the Church.79 Perhaps this
is why his closest friendships and most personal correspondence were with Dissenters,
such as the Moravian Church at Fulneck. The rise of this church was part of the larger
Evangelical revival movement in Britain and on the Continent, and Johnson’s Moravian
friends conducted some of the first large-scale missionary work. One friend also set off
for India as a writer with the East Indian Company, and another was in the Army.
Johnson’s closest friend was perhaps the minister Benjamin LaTrobe, who was also
extremely pro-government and favored coercion rather than conciliation with the
colonies. Generally historians have considered the elite Anglican clergy to be the most
coercive, and Dissenting clergy to be more pro-American, but this was not necessarily the
case.80 In America, although most loyalists were Anglican, the church was the most
divided denomination and most laypeople supported independence.81 Johnson’s Anglican
ties may have been part of the reason he was not able to fully support independence, but
it was not the only reason.
Johnson’s British friends, particularly LaTrobe, bemoaned the fate that befell him
as tensions mounted and he was no longer in a favorable position to receive lucrative job
offers from the Crown—for being an American, as Latrobe saw it. As late as 1775,
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LaTrobe praised Johnson: “If all thought as Dr. Johnson, we should soon be in peace and
harmony…Britain would make conciliatory measures if they believed that there were not
leading men on the other side of the Atlantic who aim at more than an exemption of
taxation by a British Parliament.”82 LaTrobe understood, as did Johnson, that the
Continental Congress was now calling for outright independence rather than
representation in Parliament.
LaTrobe and the other Moravians thought Johnson too good a Christian for the
politically dangerous times he found himself in. Although he received repeated offers
from patriots such as Silas Deane to join the Continental Congress, Johnson refused. To
LaTrobe, he wrote that he felt there would be little room in Congress for “Moderate Men
or Moderate Measures and with no other will I be Concerned.”83 Like Ingersoll before
him, he was labeled a Loyalist for his moderate policies and unwillingness to make a
final break with Britain. Unable to fully take part on either side, Johnson holed himself
up in his Stratford home, isolated from all of his former colonial friends. In 1779, when
the British threatened to bombard the town, his neighbors appealed to Johnson for help,
asking him to negotiate with General Tryon. In some sense this episode recaptured the
role Johnson played for much of his career: that of intermediary and go-between. As
much as he was an outsider in the community because of his loyalist affiliations, he was
also valued for his transnational connections. For the authorities, however, those
connections made him a threat. In response to his agreement to petition on behalf of the
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town, the Connecticut Council of Safety took him into custody and forced him to swear
an oath of allegiance to secure his release.84

His political future looked dim, but fortunately Connecticut suffered
comparatively little upheaval in its transition from colony to state, and colonial officials
such as Governor Trumbull—contemporaries of Johnson—remained in power throughout
the war. It was essential for loyalists to have “powerful friends within revolutionary
society” to support them after the war.85 Even so, it is surprising that Johnson managed to
take such an illustrious place in the new state government after his ignoble wartime past.
In fact, only by recalling his prewar service in London could Johnson regain the trust and
support of Connecticut voters, and “it seems ironic that the Susquehannah controversy,
which had tried his patience and imperiled his political support so many times before the
war, occasioned his return to public life.”86 Conflict had broken out between Connecticut
and Pennsylvania over disputed territory, but this time the Privy Council would not be
adjudicating. In 1782, the state of Connecticut appointed Johnson as one of three agents
to represent the state’s claim—in Congress. Although Connecticut lost the case, it did not
end the controversy, and evidently Johnson advocated so well on the state’s behalf that in
1785 they elected him to Congress. He helped draft the Connecticut Compromise and
signed the Constitution, his reacceptance into society complete. Later biographical
sketches of his life and career would make no mention of his wartime record or define
him as a loyalist in official lists and records.
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Yet strictly speaking, Johnson was a loyalist during the war, although perhaps his
actual ideology was too complex for simple labels. Elizabeth McCaughey, his biographer,
comes to the conclusion that he was “committed to American liberty and British rule, still
convinced that no malign ministerial conspiracy had rendered the two incompatible.”87 It
may very well be true that, from his experiences with Parliament, Johnson did not believe
there was a large scale attempt to deprive the colonies of their liberties. The widespread
belief in the colonies, however, was that there was a malign ministerial conspiracy, with
the king either unable or unwilling to control Parliament. Therefore, conciliation could no
longer be possible. Although Johnson himself recognized that Parliament was reacting in
the moment, unsure of how to best handle the situation and convinced in their own minds
that they were right, his letters back to Connecticut do occasionally give the impression
that the British government was no longer governed by liberty, and that Americans would
have to unite, receiving no help from Britain, to preserve these liberties. Johnson’s
correspondence, ironically, proved far more radical than he was. It is interesting to note
that from the extant collection that we have, his letters to friends in Britain stop sometime
during the 1780’s, when Johnson began to reintegrate into society and took part in
Connecticut politics once again. The content of his letters also shifted to concerns
regarding Congress and Columbia University. Even in the politicized environment of
post-revolutionary Connecticut, Johnson was well respected because he took part in “the
social community of polite letters” and his letters represented “the republican
ideal…connected to the struggle for liberty.”88 This transformation from a trans-Atlantic,
imperial figure to a local state politician is symbolic of the transformation of the entire
87
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Atlantic world. Johnson was in many ways the last of his kind. He had achieved one
major success as an agent, however: he had left England in 1771 after—probably much to
his surprise—winning the Mohegan case in Connecticut’s favor.
In 1795, Jeremy Belknap from the Massachusetts Historical Society contacted
Johnson to ask his permission to publish his correspondence with the governors of
Connecticut. His refusal—and reasons why—are illuminating: “[the letters] were
generally written in much haste, as I accidentally heard a friend was going out, or a ship
would sail at short notice…they must therefore unavoidably contain many trifling articles
of intelligence, many insignificant remarks, many crude observations, must in a word be
in all respects extremely incorrect and totally unfit for the public eye.”89 This is
somewhat disingenuous—Johnson may have been worried partly because he did not
always tow the patriot line in his letters. With respect to his modesty, however, that is
precisely why they are so interesting to historians. Johnson did indeed make many
insightful and accurate observations, but because his letters are unedited we can get a
glimpse of genuinely held beliefs and sincere—if ultimately unsuccessful—efforts to
mediate the growing conflict without resorting to propaganda.
From his correspondence with the Connecticut governors we can better grasp how
local colonial elites acted as intermediaries between the London bureaucracy and colonial
governments. From his friendships with British radicals like Nicholas Ray we can see
how British and American thinkers exchanged ideas and support, as well as where they
fundamentally disagreed. The integration of the Atlantic community is represented
through his contacts with missionaries and merchants, including Benjamin LaTrobe, the
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father of another famous migrant, American architect Benjamin Henry LaTrobe. Finally,
we can also better understand the conflicting loyalties and dilemmas faced by many of
the agents when Johnson formed friendships with both Patriot and loyalist Americans.
Further research still needs to be done on this topic, particularly concerning the
experiences of people not captured as thoroughly as elites such as Johnson in the
historical record. Women, enslaved people, and immigrants were also trans-Atlantic
figures. The numerous people in early America who did not share ideological ties to
Britain, such as Native Americans and European immigrants, also complicate questions
of national identity. Looking at their integration into the American body politic is beyond
the scope of this essay. Yet by looking particularly at the colonial agents historians can
shed light on the shaping of identity for Anglo-American elites. Johnson’s letters, written
at a time of crisis, tell the story of the destabilization of the British Atlantic world and the
agents’ ultimately futile efforts to prevent it.
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